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ABSTRACT
Introduction: The interface of military forces, civilian actors and non-state armed groups (NSAGs)
during a public health emergency within an active conflict is a situation fraught with legal and
ethical challenges not adequately addressed in established doctrine or international guidance
documents. Ongoing public health crises in Yemen and Afghanistan represent the real-world
consequences of threats to population health and security if these critical gaps are not addressed.
Methods: A list of five diverse medical scenarios was developed as an initial attempt to produce a
practical, historically-informed framework for use in future civilian-military (CIV-MIL) training events
and guidance. Ten virtual interviews with experts from the humanitarian, US government and
academic communities were conducted and qualitatively analyzed in order to identify overarching
issues surrounding NSAGs and to solicit feedback on the proposed scenario framework.
Results: Analysis of the interviews resulted in three broad areas of interest and concern
surrounding NSAGs: 1. definitional challenges; 2. the value of historical precedence; 3. ethics and
international humanitarian law. Patterns that were identified from discussion of the scenario
framework include: 1. gaps in public health specific CIV-MIL training; 2. relationship building and
trust; 3. critical feedback and assessment for each of the five specific scenarios.
Discussion: The guidance documents within the CIV-MIL community surrounding NSAGs and public
health emergencies should be revised with a focus on integration of the two concepts. Updates are
required in order to ensure existing institutional knowledge and critical planning factors are
captured and considered. The scenario framework was well-received and should be propagated
among additional stakeholders in the humanitarian ecosystem for further examination and analysis,
as well as included in future CIV-MIL humanitarian workshops and training events.
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INTRODUCTION
National armed forces are being utilized more frequently to respond to situations of
significant public health concern during which they may be required to interact with non-state
armed groups (NSAGs).1 While mission objectives vary, they may include the full range of
military activities from routine, peacetime engagement to active conflict settings in areas
influenced by those NSAGs or rival state powers with a variety of regional interests. The
resulting interface of military forces, civilian actors and NSAGs during a public health
emergency within an active conflict is a situation fraught with legal and ethical challenges not
adequately addressed in established doctrine or international guidance documents. 2 These
challenges can be conceptually divided into three elements: 1) joint response to public health
concerns in cooperation with NSAGs; 2) material support to NSAGs during public health
operations; 3) decisions of whether to allow third party organizations to collaborate with
NSAGs within humanitarian-related operations.
Western foreign policy during counter-terrorism operations has emphasized the threat
that failed or failing states pose to global security and global health, and that threat remains
today.3 Recent proliferation and entrenchment of NSAGs such as the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) across the Middle East and Boko Haram in Nigeria are not addressed within current
civilian-military (CIV-MIL) international guidance and training programs for both armed actors
and humanitarian organizations. Only by acknowledging and addressing this gap is it possible to
ensure that conflict scenarios with substantial risk to public health operations and national
security efforts do not deteriorate due to a lack of institutionalized knowledge surrounding
NSAGs. Potential real-world challenges that necessitate CIV-MIL-NSAG cooperation must be
4

identified and sufficiently addressed if the end goal is to protect vulnerable populations and
national strategic interests during complex public health emergencies.
Challenges Associated with Public Health Operations and NSAGs: Examples
The enduring crisis in Yemen illustrates how the presence of one or more NSAGs can
significantly impair international CIV-MIL humanitarian response. Although the conflict in
Yemen is multifaceted, opposition to Houthi rebel forces by the US Government (USG) stems
partly from suspected Houthi ties to Iran.4 As such, the USG has previously supported the
opposing side in the conflict led by Saudi Arabia and a broad coalition of partners from across
the Middle East, although the Biden administration recently declared an end to US support for
offensive operations against Houthi forces. Tens of millions of Yemenis remain at risk of
starvation, food and water-borne disease such as cholera, and other medical issues due to lack
of basic sanitation and healthcare infrastructure.5 Complicating matters even further has been
the reluctance of Houthi forces to agree to terms of aid provision with humanitarian groups. 6
The World Food Programme famously threatened to cut aid provisions in 2019 if Houthi forces
did not agree to a biometric tracking system used to ensure food distribution was actually
reaching those in need of aid, which the Houthis openly opposed as a security threat. 7 These
tensions and delays create additional hardships for those with no other alternatives for survival
aside from outside assistance. Suffice it to say that the absence of doctrine and agreed upon
practices centered on NSAG engagement within a crisis such as Yemen has resulted in the
worsening of an already catastrophic humanitarian emergency.
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Many public health programs and initiatives that have proven effective in other settings
can quickly fall apart when faced with a complex humanitarian emergency populated by NSAGs.
Examining the compounding effects of the SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic in a region under
the control of NSAGs provides an ongoing example. Afghanistan and Pakistan remain a
significant concern for the international medical community as efforts to eradicate poliomyelitis
(polio) have once again stalled and case numbers have risen. 8 In March 2020, the World Health
Organization (WHO) recommended that many vaccination campaigns to cease temporarily due
to the COVID-19 pandemic.9 While the order was subsequently lifted a few months later, this
gap in vaccination coverage coupled with the active efforts of the Taliban to suppress
vaccinator access to vulnerable populations has created a perfect storm for polio resurgence in
the region, particularly among children. Historical distrust among the local population from
foreign military occupation and the influence of the Taliban are obvious impediments to
implementation of one of the most successful global health campaigns that has been broadly
effective in other contexts.
This study contends that the lack of defined parameters regarding the engagement of
NSAGs during public health crises will continue to threaten population health as well as
human and national security if steps are not taken to address existing doctrine and training
gaps. The research seeks to answer two overarching questions: First, what are the prevailing
challenges surrounding CIV-MIL interactions with NSAGs during a complex humanitarian
emergency? Second, is a training framework for public health-specific scenarios something that
is needed in the CIV-MIL humanitarian ecosystem, and if so, how would it be received?
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BACKGROUND
Civilian-Military Relations
The interaction of humanitarian actors and national armed forces is not a new
phenomenon. As with any activity that has the potential for scholarly disagreement and
frequently shifting policies, there is a plethora of literature and published guidance related to
CIV-MIL relations during humanitarian operations. Before continuing, there is an important
distinction to make between domestic, or civil, relations with militaries, and those relationships
that exist with civilian humanitarian agencies that are the focus of this research. In most
Western societies such as the US, overall control of military forces is implemented by the
civilian government. This study does not consider the complexities that exist regarding proper
governance of military forces within domestic disaster contexts. Within this discussion, ‘CIVMIL’ refers to relationships and interactions between national militaries and civilian agencies
outside of the government structure such as humanitarian international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (UN).
One complication surrounding humanitarian CIV-MIL relations is the lack of a
standardized acronym or shorthand that is universally utilized within the field. Although a
seemingly minor issue, multiple descriptors that refer to essentially the same phenomenon may
create complications with basic communication and difficultly in examining published
literature. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) utilizes the
phrase humanitarian civil-military coordination, or CMCoord. Many European militaries and
academics use the term civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), while the US military may use civil-
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military operations (CMO) along with CIV-MIL cooperation. Interestingly, the use of CIMIC
appears to be largely absent from USG and US military doctrine. Military forces may engage
with civilian agencies for many purposes other than humanitarian operations, so vague
distinctions may be intentional. Regardless of which acronym is used, the definition from
UNOCHA is appropriate in the case of CIV-MIL humanitarian assistance operations: “UNCMCoord is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in
humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles,
avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals”. 10
Whether dialogue, relationships or coordination, all the various terms refer to scenarios where
civilian and military personnel are required to function in close proximity to accomplish joint
operational objectives.
Literature and Doctrine Review
The existing literature surrounding humanitarian CIV-MIL relations was examined to
better understand the extent of discourse surrounding NSAGs and public health emergencies as
a unique disaster context. Utilizing multiple databases and search strategies allowed for a broad
overview of relevant literature, to include military doctrine and international humanitarian
guidance documents. Existing publicly available documents can be conceptually separated into
three broad categories: international humanitarian guidance documents, academic literature
and official military doctrine. In collaboration with members of the Yale library team, three
primary electronic databases were explored: PubMed, Google Scholar and Dimensions.

8

PubMed was selected due to the primary focus on biomedical literature, which includes
relevant discussions of public health and humanitarian action. The search terms included:
humanitarian[tw] AND (civil-military[tw] OR civilian-military[tw] OR military-civil*[tw] OR civmil[tw] OR mil-civ[tw] OR CIMIC[tw]), which yielded 44 results. Text words (tw) were searched
to ensure that any of the various CIV-MIL acronyms would be detected by the database search
engine. Google Scholar and Dimensions were utilized using similar search strategies. Both of
these databases allowed for full-text examination for the following search terms: humanitarian
& "civil-military coordination" & health & "non-state armed groups". These terms yield 86
results in Dimensions and 80 from Google Scholar. The search terms were modified multiple
times for both databases and slight modification to the terms did not yield additional significant
results overall. For example, by removing “non-state armed groups” and including “armed
groups”, the results increased to approximately 250. This is likely due to authors utilizing the
term ‘armed group’ to refer to more formal military forces and not NSAGs specifically. Also,
including the term ‘public’ rather than just ‘health’ triggered the inclusion of many non-relevant
studies for this project, so public was intentionally left out of the searches for these databases.
A true systematic literature review was not performed, but the strategy utilized allowed for an
efficient review of readily available documents in the CIV-MIL literature. International guidance
documents and military doctrine were inconsistently present within the search results. These
sources were obtained via consultation with the US Naval War College (USNWC) Humanitarian
Response Program and through publicly accessible USG websites.
A user-friendly, comprehensive single source for humanitarian practitioner guidance on
CIV-MIL operations exists as the UNOCHA UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0 (2018). 11
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This 88-page document contains summaries of humanitarian concepts and coordination
mechanisms, as well as discussions of military functions and structure targeted at those
humanitarians who have little familiarity with typical (Western) military structure. Chapter 3 of
the handbook contains a summary of the four guidelines developed by the humanitarian
community for planning and execution of CIV-MIL operations. The four guidance documents
central to UN-CMCoord are:
1. Oslo Guidelines (2007)12
2. Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) Guidelines (2006) 13
3. Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper on CIV-MIL Relationship in
Complex Emergencies (2004)14
4. The IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys
(2013)15
While these documents provide a wealth of information and have been critical to the positive
progress seen within CIV-MIL humanitarian relations, they are quite dated. Significant changes
have occurred globally over the past 15+ years, and two areas not specifically addressed in
detail are NSAGs and public health emergencies.
The Field Handbook states that NSAGs interactions are not dealt with in UN-CMCoord
guidelines and refers readers to the OCHA Manual on Humanitarian Negotiation with Armed
Groups (2006).16 This 97-page document details recommendations and practices for
negotiations with NSAGs during humanitarian operations. Unfortunately, there seems to be a
gap within the UN guidance documents concerning humanitarian emergencies that require
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interactions and/or cooperation between civilians, military actors and NSAGs. In a form of
circular reasoning, each document refers the reader to the other while never addressing how
to conduct operations when all three actors are involved. Although the UN does not represent
the only source for humanitarian guidelines and recommendations for effective CIV-MIL or CIVNSAG interactions, given the international recognition and role of the UN it is very unlikely that
the gap of CIV-MIL-NSAG interaction has been thoroughly addressed elsewhere in the
humanitarian community. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is recognized as
a leader among humanitarian organizations regarding engagement with NSAGs, with a recently
published position paper discussing critical legal issues and challenges to engagement. 17 While
detailing many significant aspects of the complications that may result from establishing
relationships with NSAGs from a humanitarian perspective, this document does not address
those situations that also involve national military forces.
A recent work by researchers in the United Kingdom reviewed the major international
humanitarian guidance documents with a focus on specific application to complex public health
emergencies.2 This paper raises the concern that classification of a developing emergency as
either ‘humanitarian’ or ‘public health’ may trigger vastly different response from the
international aid community as well as militaries, and additional efforts are needed to address
the gaps that exist to include complications that may arise from NSAG involvement. There are
numerous other examples in the literature that examine gaps and inefficiencies in the CIV-MIL
humanitarian response system, and response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa is one
of the most well analyzed. One study described the Ebola outbreak as illuminating “numerous
problems with regard to coordination of humanitarian disasters that have public health
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implications of international consequence”.18 The US Department of Defense (DoD) also
released a lengthy analysis of its’ operations in West Africa, known as Operation United
Assistance, which is recognized as “the first US military operation to support a disease-driven
foreign humanitarian assistance mission”.19 Many shortfalls were acknowledged by DoD in the
report, including lack of cohesive planning efforts and a shortage of appropriate training
opportunities for DoD personnel that may be involved in complex public health emergency
response.
An important note from the literature review relates to the differentiation of public
health-driven humanitarian response and natural disaster scenarios. CIV-MIL coordination in
certain natural disaster scenarios has produced results that would not have been possible
without contributions from both sides and this success must be acknowledged. In the aftermath
of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, an unprecedented humanitarian response from the
global community unfolded which included international military forces. 20 Although the military
response was relatively short-lived compared with most other organizations, the joint report
from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) recognized the critical role of the military in the
early phases of response as well predicting the inevitability of military involvement in future
global humanitarian efforts. Other reports of successful military support to natural disasters are
prevalent in the literature, and one repository for reports from military sources (such as the
service war colleges) is the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Examples include
support to Hurricane Mitch recovery efforts in Central America in 1998 and Joint Task ForceHaiti earthquake response in 2010.21,22 While recognizing successes within CIV-MIL coordination
during natural disaster response, the responses were by no means without issue. The TEC
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report emphasized the lack of opportunities for training between the military and humanitarian
actors, and that “field coordination between them remains weak”.20 This is especially relevant
for public health emergencies which often entail complexities beyond the scope of traditional
response to natural disasters that are much better deliberated prior to initiation of response
efforts.
Finally, a brief mention of US military doctrine is warranted to highlight relevant gaps
specific to NSAGs and CIV-MIL public health operations. While other national militaries may
more substantially address these issues within their formal policies, they are outside the scope
of the authors’ expertise and were not considered for this research. Additionally, US service
component doctrine was not analyzed, as these are based on higher level guidance and, by
design, aligned with higher level joint doctrine.
Joint Publication (JP) 3-57: Civil-Military Operations was updated in 2018 and addresses
medical CIV-MIL operations in Annex C to Appendix A. 23 This annex specifically addresses the
planning considerations for military medical planners when analyzing mission requirements,
and references the importance of interagency collaboration within the USG, as well as including
civilian health partners such as WHO and INGOs in the process. While this doctrine provides a
well-reasoned approach for joint public health operations in a humanitarian context, there is no
discussion of NSAGs and no specific scenarios or case studies mentioned aside from Ebola
response and Operation United Assistance in 2014.
JP 3-29: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance was updated in 2019 and “describes the scope
and purpose of the DoD foreign humanitarian assistance activities”, to include relationships
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with INGOs, private sector partners and other non-USG agencies. 24 This document also contains
a robust discussion of public health, preventive medicine and internally displaced persons (IDP)
to help guide military planners during preparation for Health Services Support within
humanitarian operations. Legal issues surrounding certain processes of information sharing and
eligibility for medical care are also addressed, as are the humanitarian Sphere Project standards
and descriptions of important international aid organizations such as ICRC, multiple UN
agencies and the International Organization for Migration.25 Similar to JP 3-57, there is no
mention of NSAGs or recommendations for conducting operations where these groups have
considerable influence. Training is referenced frequently within JP 3-29, and the importance of
including INGOs and other international organizations in the mission planning process is
stressed as critical to operational success. The document also outlines DoD activities involved in
humanitarian assistance operations such as the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management
and Humanitarian Assistance and the Center for Global Health Engagement. While mostly
comprehensive, JP 3-29 and JP 3-57 do not include references of specific scenarios to reference
within CIV-MIL training events as have been proposed in this study.
The findings of the literature review were consistent with assumptions held prior to
initiation of the research: a doctrinal gap exists in CIV-MIL humanitarian relations regarding
relevant joint planning and training considerations for public health operations involving
NSAGs. While public health and NSAGs are extensively addressed in a variety of sources, there
is a lack of publicly available, evidence-based documentation on how and why the integration
of these two areas should be formally addressed during preparation and training events for CIVMIL humanitarian operations. In an attempt to help bridge the identified gap between theory
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and practice, this study proposes a new planning framework to assist humanitarians and
militaries with conceptualizing scenarios and potentially contentious legal and ethical situations
that may arise when engaging with NSAGs throughout a complex public health emergency.

METHODS
Development of a Public Health Scenario Framework
A list of five diverse medical scenarios was developed as an initial attempt to produce a
practical, historically-informed framework for use in future CIV-MIL training events and
guidance. A similar training methodology applicable to public health was not uncovered via
literature review. A 2020 study from the British Medical Journal proposed a typology to better
define medical CIV-MIL interactions, but the authors state that their typology is not intended to
directly address engagement with NSAGs.26
Historically, doctrine and guidance within both the humanitarian community and
militaries are based on areas of activity (logistics, medical, intelligence, etc.). Examining
operational scenarios within a specific area of activity allows for identification of ethical, legal
and technical challenges that may arise within a specific context. By ascertaining limitations and
determining what capabilities each group member possesses, civilian actors, military forces and
NSAGs can begin to understand the situationally specific alliances that will be required for
provision of public health or medical assistance. This research considered various situations
that may arise necessitating CIV-MIL interactions with NSAG, and determined that joint

15

response with NSAGs, material support of NSAGs and third-party collaboration with NSAGs are
the most relevant activities that should be addressed.
Natural disasters were intentionally omitted from this framework since the focus is on
medical engagements and conflict settings, although depending on the specific context of the
humanitarian operation natural disaster particulars may be critical to address in planning
efforts. This framework is also not intended to cover every possible situation that may arise
throughout a complex public health emergency. The framework is designed to serve as a
mechanism to highlight ethical, legal and technical points for discussion and consideration that
could support deconfliction of future tensions or mitigation of friction points prior to initiation
of a real-world humanitarian response.
The following five operational scenarios represent the initial effort in the development
of a standardized methodology that could eventually be included in peacetime CIV-MIL joint
exercises as well as pre-deployment trainings for both humanitarians and military forces (see
Appendix 1 for a detailed rationale and scenario list with examples presented during virtual
interviews):
1. Infectious disease / Pandemic response
2. Emergency medical operations as part of urban clearance operations
3. Provision of non-emergency, clinical medical assistance
4. Joint distribution of non-clinical public health assistance
5. Public health & humanitarian operations coupled with intelligence collection

16

In order to assess interest and garner critical feedback on this framework, virtual notfor-attribution interviews were conducted with subject matter experts from throughout the
humanitarian community, members of academia and current and former members of USG
agencies. Interviewee experience included various UN agencies, US DoD, US Department of
State (DoS), US Health and Human Services, multiple academic institutions and INGOs such as
Save the Children. Potential study participants were identified via the director of the USNWC
Humanitarian Response Program, who has an extensive professional network of both civilian
and military professionals with experience applicable to this study. Faculty at the Yale Jackson
Institute for Global affairs also assisted with identification of potential study participants via
previously established relationships.
A standard recruitment email was sent to all participants, along with a consent form
detailing the intent of the research and how the interviews would be utilized to inform
refinement of the initial scenario list (Appendix 2 & 3). The research protocol was deemed
exempt via the Yale Institutional Review Board. A total of 10 interviews were completed, each
approximately 45-60 minutes in length. Each interview was recorded via the Zoom platform to
facilitate qualitative analysis and to minimize note-taking during the discussions. All
interviewees provided affirmative written or verbal consent prior to the start of the interview.
The interviews were semi-structured to allow for varied experiences and expertise as well as to
stimulate a natural flow of conversation. A general list of interview questions was referenced
for the interviews, with slight modifications made depending on the background of each
interviewee. Although each interview was necessarily different, certain key questions were
asked of all participants in order maintain continuity. Participants were sent a two-page primer
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prior to the interview that introduced the rationale for the development of the five scenarios
and the list of scenarios (Appendix 1). Each of the scenarios was complemented with real-world
examples and additional details to assist the participants in conceptualizing why scenarios were
chosen and to highlight important legal and ethical considerations. Points of emphasis during
the interviews included NSAGs definition in theory and practical terms, ethical decision
processes surrounding CIV-MIL engagement with NSAGs, effectiveness of existing CIV-MIL
training opportunities and the evolution of cooperation between humanitarians and militaries.
Interview Analysis
Key informant interviews were analyzed through extensive review of digital recordings
and detailed note taking. Full interview transcripts were not created for this study, and
qualitative analysis software was not utilized. The approach to analysis was adopted after
evaluation of qualitative methods literature, and a modified framework approach was used to
accomplish familiarization with the data, identification of key issues, concepts and themes, and
finally to assist with interpretation of the interview findings and notes. 27 While full transcription
of each interview is often the ideal scenario, there are alternative methods within qualitative
research that can facilitate proper data management in a reasonable timeframe and support
the strategy utilized in this study.28 Steps described in this method include audio recording,
reflective journaling post-interview, reviewing the interview recordings in depth, content
analysis and thematic review. Data analysis for this study was accomplished through a similar
stepwise approach. Interviews were reviewed individually and manual notes taken, with a
mixture of verbatim quotations and summary points recorded. These notes were then reviewed
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in order to identify themes that emerged from the responses to specific questions asked of
each participant.
The interviews were structured to cover two main topic areas: NSAGs and the scenario
framework. Discussions and critiques from the interviews were synthesized to form a better
understanding of current issues surrounding CIV-MIL humanitarian operations involving NSAGs,
and to consolidate recommendations and criticism of the framework.

RESULTS
In an attempt to inform and answer the research questions, interview responses were
grouped and analyzed according to topic area and then further classified within a particular
theme. Relevant responses were clustered into three themes for NSAGs and three for the
scenario framework.
1) NSAGs
a. Definitional Challenges
While each of the study participants was familiar with the concept of a NSAG, there was
significant variation in responses when each interviewee was asked to provide their own
working definition of what the term encompasses. Unsurprisingly, each participant highlighted
some form of separation from an internationally recognized state government, although many
remarked that there are often unofficial affiliations that occur ‘off the record’ where the state
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may be providing the funding and the NSAG executing the plan on the ground. Participants
commented that NSAGs are currently a nebulous idea:
“(NSAGs are) a well-recognized concept, but ill-defined.”
“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter – it’s all about perspective.”
Perspective was an important point for many during the interviews, as classification of a
particular group may have political consequences within an operation where humanitarian
efforts are underway. One participant from the INGO community noted:
“The term itself is politicized… it is extremely context specific and it depends on who you
ask.”
There was broad agreement that one of the biggest challenges in addressing issues surrounding
interactions with these groups is the lack of defined parameters of what criteria must be met to
label an actor as a NSAG.
There were varied responses regarding whether or not a NSAG are considered ‘violent’
armed actors in the context of a humanitarian action. A USG-affiliated participant stated that
NSAGs should not always be considered simply as non-governmental groups with weapons, but
should be conceptualized by their ability to influence the effectiveness of the humanitarian
community in accomplishing their goals. An interviewee with substantial UN experience
described the importance of addressing these definitional challenges:

20

“One of the biggest shortfalls in engaging with NSAGs is the definitional piece… does it
include those who are on terrorist lists?... a lot of the problems stem from the lack of a
common definition or a common understanding.”
There was additional disagreement on the scope of organizations that may qualify as
NSAG, which seemed to vary with the particular experiences of the interviewee. One expert
from academia noted:
“the biggest generalizable factor is their interest in legitimacy amongst both the civilian
population and the international community.”
The idea of legitimacy amongst these actors is a concept of critical importance when
attempting to engage during CIV-MIL humanitarian operations, as underlying motivations can
vary widely depending on the context in which the group operates. One participant included
within their definition a “local ‘cartel’ or networks of illegal activities,” while another had the
opinion that a NSAG is “not a simple ‘for-profit’ operation.” Their belief is that a NSAG must
have some sort of political agenda even if it is very loosely defined, which was not an opinion
shared among all of those interviewed for this study.
Overall, nine of the ten participants commented on the lack of commonly agreed upon
definitions surrounding NSAG both generally and within humanitarian settings, and how this
has resulted in past frustrations and likely will result in complications during future operations if
left unresolved.
b. Value of Historical Precedence
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When asked whether or not there is value in addressing historical examples of NSAG
when planning or conducting a humanitarian operation, there was general agreement that not
accounting for past experiences is a mistake. However, given the incredibly diverse population
of NSAGs present globally today, generalizability presents a difficult challenge. The ICRC
estimates that “between 60 to 80 million people live under the direct State-like governance of
armed groups”.17 This variability represents a unique situation within CIV-MIL humanitarian
operations as simply knowing there are NSAGs present in the vicinity will not provide any
significant planning or operational value. One interviewee from academia did see a possible
avenue to work though this issue, and stated:
“There is way to look at NSAG today and be able to generalize: Sources of pressure, who
do they care about impressing?”
This viewpoint will allow for past experiences involving NSAG to inform future scenario
planning, while not explicitly dictating the specifics of the mission, which was a sentiment
supported by multiple participants. These groups are in a constant struggle for legitimacy
among the local populace, and in many cases with the international community at large.
Understanding who NSAGs are looking to appease is a critical component to realize prior to
engagement if at all possible, given that each context is unique. There was also a suggestion to
begin viewing NSAG in a similar way that the international community views national military
forces. Referencing a tiered-type classification system:
“We don’t look at all militaries as the same, but we do have criteria for what makes up a
national army.”
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This approach would allow for a basic separation of military forces by level of organization,
funding, etc., and could be broadly applicable when analyzing specific NSAGs.
Other respondents were more pessimistic about the overall value of analyzing the past
behavior of NSAGs, viewing differences as largely personality based as well as widely varying
levels of knowledge, training and technical ability even among groups that seem quite similar
from an outsider’s perspective. There are also examples of evolutions within NSAGs over time,
such as the Taliban changing behavior and developing different agendas as the years progress.
An interviewee with experience in the Middle East remarked:
“It is very difficult to ever come into any of those situations, from the outside, thinking
you have a good enough understanding of the complexities on the ground.”
The differences between Yemen, Syria and Afghanistan were brought up in multiple discussions
as settings that while on the surface may seem like similar crises in fact have little commonality
due to vast differences in international military involvement and whether or not a functioning
state government actually exists. While cultural sensitivity to regional variation is increasingly
being recognized as critical to the success of humanitarian operations, one interviewee
declared:
“We don’t build a humanitarian force to work within that environment.”
This was discussed more frequently in regard to militaries, but was also acknowledged by those
with experience in the civilian humanitarian sector as an ongoing problem. The responses
support the assertion that within the field of CIV-MIL humanitarianism there is a lack of
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documentation and institutional knowledge surrounding NSAG, and that the CIV-MIL field
needs a more interdisciplinary historical perspective.
c. Ethics and IHL
Ethical issues were of particular interest to many of the participants, especially in terms
of application of and adherence to international humanitarian law (IHL) by NSAGs. In terms of
policy and specific guidance, however, there were very few concrete examples discussed. Most
of the ethical scenarios that arise are dealt with at the sub-national level within the
humanitarian community, and lower levels of military organizations (i.e. – below the traditional
Western military Brigade or Division Commander level of authority). There was general support
for the idea that many of these matters that could be considered ethically ‘questionable’ are
intentionally left vague as to allow those at lower levels to make decisions in real time based on
the best available information. A participant from the humanitarian sector observed:
“There is an intentional degree of flexibility that you get through fuzzier definitions; if
you get overly precise then there is a rigidity to the application of that doctrine or
guidance in many different contexts.”
One interviewee with DoD experience also indicated the same sentiment as they described
ambiguous orders or restrictions that are put in place, with room for significant latitude at the
lowest levels in terms of engagement with NSAGs in certain contexts but not others. The idea of
‘shared understanding’ arose in multiple interviews, which supports the idea of higher-level
policies supporting the freedom for those with up-to-date information to make their own
decisions in real time. This can, however, lead to decisions being made in the heat of the
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moment that could be questioned from both legal and ethical standpoints after the fact. This
supports the argument that those making the choices should be properly trained and informed
about scenarios they are likely to encounter during a crisis.
There was concern among multiple interviewees about the application of IHL as it
relates to NSAGs. One participant remarked that NSAGs are often unlikely to adhere to IHL in
many cases for political or personal reasons:
“They weren’t a part of creating IHL; if they had a more active hand in creating it (IHL)
they would be more willing to follow it.”
There are organizations such as Geneva Call that have done extensive engagement with NSAGs
on IHL which has allowed much greater insight in recent years, as well as the previously
mentioned work by ICRC.29 While a positive sign in many ways, the reality remains that even
though high-level members of certain NSAGs have respect for IHL in some cases, the level of
awareness and interest in IHL often declines with increasing distance from top leadership. This
was raised as an issue that must be considered, as although a NSAG may have a documented
stance on IHL publicly those members interfacing directly with CIV-MIL humanitarian
operations may have different motivations altogether.
An issue was also raised by one interviewee regarding IHL and the responsibilities of an
occupying force when it comes to provision of humanitarian aid. Referring to the current crisis
in Syria:
“I think there needs to be a better identification inside the USG in general about what
are our responsibilities as the controlling (occupying) power when we control a territory
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in a foreign country? What are our responsibilities in terms of providing healthcare to
the population that is physically under our control?”
This is an important consideration during future complex emergencies, as often the ethical
decision-making process and application of IHL is inconsistent on among CIV-MIL actors as well
as NSAGs, and perhaps discussing these issues beforehand may alleviate certain difficulties.
While ethically contentious issues may not ever be amenable to formalized policy or
doctrine, ethics should be discussed openly and honestly in various forums such as CIV-MIL
training events and humanitarian conferences. Multiple interviewees acknowledged that
ethical decision making will always be inherently subjective and context specific:
“You have to be realistic about where you’re trying to get, and if where you’re trying to
get is a better place then it may be necessary to cut an ethical corner here and there to
get there… it’s a subjective judgement.”
“If you know you are going to run into ethical situations, contend with it up front
honestly and openly so when those situations occur you are not hiding behind the
curtain, and it has already been established what you are doing.”
There were also multiple instances where medical ethics were explicitly mentioned,
which can in some cases act as a bridge between the humanitarian and military communities.
Medical professionals on both sides have the same desire: to save lives and alleviate suffering.
While each side will have their own mission objectives that are context specific, in a public
health emergency there is often a common ground that is identified in order to provide
lifesaving interventions. This was clearly demonstrated during the 2014 international response
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to Ebola in West Africa. Multiple interviewees discussed the importance of this response and
the unprecedented cooperation that ensued between INGOs, military forces, host nation
governments and local actors. The one important caveat to the Ebola response as it relates to
this study is that the outbreak did not occur in an active conflict setting where NSAGs held
significant power. Had this been the case, the prevailing sentiment among interviewees is that
legal and ethical compromises with NSAGs would likely have been made and unorthodox
approaches utilized when faced with a rapidly evolving complex crisis such as an infectious
disease outbreak. The Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) beginning
in 2018 has exemplified the fears surrounding infectious disease response in a conflict zone,
and researchers have demonstrated a correlation of increased Ebola incidence per capita with
increasing rates of conflict within certain regions of DRC.30
2) Scenario Framework
a. Gaps in Public Health Specific CIV-MIL Training
The general response was positive across participants when presented with the basic
framework that was developed for CIV-MIL complex public health emergencies involving
NSAGs. There were no other frameworks or similar ongoing efforts identified by the
interviewees, although UNOCHA was identified as an organization that recognizes the
importance of NSAG engagement in health emergencies and is working toward more effective
training in the CIV-MIL community. Humanitarian agencies were noted to have made
substantially more progress on NSAG engagement when compared to the USG which has little
formalized policy on NSAGs, particularly within the Military Health System.
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Joint training events were identified as desired and are available in many cases, but
difficulties remain on ensuring the right mix of stakeholders are attending to maximize the
outcome. In general, the idea of a training framework to be utilized in a pre-deployment setting
or in peacetime joint exercises was very well received and multiple experts indicated their
belief that the time to act is now:
“This is the kind of specialized guidance that CIV-MIL has been lacking for far too long…
to focus in on PH as a specific domain that requires specific tailored guidance, I think is
extremely welcome and could not be more timely given that the COVID crest is going to
wane over the next 1.5 years and now is the time to frontline public health as a priority
in all sectors, including CIV-MIL coordination.”
“I think there is a demand signal out there, but it’s been neglected because most
humanitarians aren’t medical and we don’t necessarily come from the public health side
so we don’t design trainings that meet this gap – but there is definitely a gap.”
The idea of separating natural disaster contexts from those situations that involve a significant
public health component was understood in a logical sense, but multiple participants voiced
their concern that if natural disaster scenarios were completely excluded during joint training
events that critical discussion would not occur. Situations will most likely arise that encompass
both domains, particularly with increasing population displacement in the face of climate
change and environmental degradation. There is also the risk of alienating certain segments of
the humanitarian response community, who may feel as they are not being consulted and thus
may be less likely to engage in these public health-specific discussions.
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b. Individual Scenario Commentary
i. Infectious Disease / Pandemic Response
This scenario was the least controversial and received the fewest comments overall. All
participants agreed that infectious disease outbreaks represent a unique challenge to the
humanitarian community and CIV-MIL operations. Whether the responses would have been the
same in 2019 vs 2021 is impossible to know, but there is no doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic
has solidified the importance of identifying and addressing gaps in infectious disease response
planning on a global scale. A participant with UN ties stated:
“We are desperately trying to come up with better guidance for humanitarians engaging
with the military, especially in pandemic response.”
There were additional cautions noted within this scenario if engagement with NSAGs is
necessary, specifically surrounding misinformation and NSAGs trying to disrupt medical
operations in the areas under their control or influence:
“Misinformation is a huge challenge in infectious disease responses at the community
and NSAG level.”
Given that these groups are struggling for legitimacy among the local population, they may
actively attempt to spread false information to discredit foreign aid workers or military forces
which may limit humanitarian access and potentially prolong or worsen an outbreak.
ii. Emergency Medical Operations as Part of Urban Clearance
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There was significant disagreement among the interviewees on whether this scenario should be
specifically urban in nature, or be broadened to encompass emergency medical operations in
all settings. The urban environment was recognized as extremely important to consider during
planning sessions, as it contains particular dangers and complications that need to be
addressed prior to an operation. The 2016-2017 Battle of Mosul trauma response is a critical
case study for this scenario, as the humanitarian community was largely split into two camps
about whether the proposed level of engagement with armed forces was appropriate in the
first place.31 On the other hand, multiple participants were concerned that if the focus was on
only urban environments CIV-MIL planners may become too narrowly focused and miss
important details that fall outside of urban boundaries:
“By pigeon-holing urban you can effectively limit military planners – they will basically
pull out the ‘urban warfare’ guide.”
Additionally, a participant with DoD background referenced the fact that many operations will
quickly transition between rural and urban settings, necessitating a flexible and mobile
approach to emergency medical care in a CIV-MIL environment. Overall, a majority of
participants felt that this scenario should be broadened to encompass emergency medical care
in all operational environments, not just urban:
“I wonder why you have framed this as urban clearance, as opposed to emergency
medical operations in armed conflict more broadly? … I’m thinking of Afghanistan and
providing medical aid to wounded Taliban fighters and managing relations with the
international coalition.”
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Regardless of whether the framework is altered to broaden the scenario to include all
operational environments, the fact remains that the urban context is unique as it pertains to
NSAGs and the consequences of existing doctrinal gaps have proven deadly in the past. The
1993 US-led Operation Gothic Serpent, widely known as ‘Black Hawk Down’, reveals the
dangers of underestimating the potential lethality of a NSAG in an urban environment where
they own popular support. After Somalia, the USG became wary of involvement in other
humanitarian crises such as Rwanda and Darfur and the loss of American lives “contributed to a
reluctance to engage for purely humanitarian reasons where there was a reasonable risk of
combat”.32 The lingering trauma of this operation is still influential in USG humanitarian policy
decisions nearly two decades later.
iii. Provision of Non-emergency, Clinical Medical Assistance & Joint Distribution of Non-clinical
Public Health Assistance
These two scenarios were each recognized as important to consider by the participants,
but did not receive a large number of critiques or additional recommendations. One concern
raised relates to provision of non-emergency clinical assistance and the increasing number of
displaced persons on a global scale:
“This is the context we are seeing all over the world today that USG isn’t involved in:
humanitarian action for migrant populations (but the US is involved in its’ own border
crisis) that has major public health implications. This will become a major issue for the
US military in the future and we will not be able to not participate in this given how
migration is expanding globally.”
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There were also concerns about how to prioritize certain populations given that priorities often
differ between the CIV-MIL teams providing aid and the host nation population:
“In the real world on the field, USG health resources are often limited. Not because we’re
bad people but because we are far from home… host country people (government or
NSAG) ... they may want us to prioritize certain populations or medical actions that our
own experts don’t agree with, so how do you work that out?”
The issue of prioritization and communication with the local populations was raised frequently,
as it was recognized by many participants that humanitarian operations often do not address
the important factor of community perception, meaning examining how the external actors are
perceived by the local populace. Particularly in these two scenarios, community perception of
NSAG will be critical to understand and address if these public health interventions are to be
successful.
iv. Public health & humanitarian operations coupled with intelligence collection
This scenario was by far the most controversial, with significant concern about how it
would be received by the non-military community if framed inappropriately. The infamous
example that has shaped perception on this issue is the US-led effort to locate Osama bin Laden
and the use of a vaccination campaign as cover for an intelligence gathering operation within
Pakistan.33 The eventual exposure of USG involvement resulted in backlash against vaccinators
in the region and is implicated as a major setback in efforts to eradicate polio within the region.
As the fallout from this operation is still fresh in the minds of many in the humanitarian
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community, any discussion of intelligence or data collection that is coupled with provision of aid
must be approached with extreme caution.
Although controversial, many interviewees highlighted the importance of directly
addressing this topic in CIV-MIL training events and in mission planning discussions. The
importance of overt discussion was of critical importance, so that all parties involved can make
informed decisions on their comfort with the plan. This issue becomes even more complicated
when partnering with NSAG for humanitarian operations:
“I do think there is value in discussing it (Scenario #5) … NSAGs are far more
sophisticated in mining information than we would usually give them credit for… this has
caused humanitarians to rethink their engagements.”
The main risk identified by members of the humanitarian community is the potential of
alienation from the affected communities they are trying to assist. If these vulnerable
communities perceive the outside agencies as spies, then access will be limited and those in
need may suffer the fatal consequences. As a counter point, the question was raised if
intelligence collection is inherently inappropriate as long as it is not tied directly to the
provision of medical care or humanitarian aid? This highlights the importance of having these
discussions prior to initiation of response efforts, as while some agencies may see no problems
with data collection others may vehemently object if they feel the information could be used
for nefarious purposes at a later date.
There should also be open discussion surrounding differences between intelligence
collection and the routine military process of relaying certain information along the chain of
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command known among US forces as Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
(CCIRs).34 A military Commander establishes a set of information requirements that they deem
necessary to enable timely decision-making during mission execution, and subordinates are
required to provide this information in the most expedient manner possible. These
requirements may not sit well with humanitarians involved in joint operations who may view
the CCIRs as an avenue for military forces to gather intelligence on the local populace for
purposes other than provision of relief. If discussions of CCIRs were broached in training events
and other forums, perhaps civilian agencies would be more understanding of the requirements
of militaries during CIV-MIL operations in the field. Regardless of the disagreement on the best
way to handle this scenario among the participants, there were no instances where the
interviewee recommended removing this scenario from the list altogether and many said it is
critical to address as soon as possible during the planning process.
c. Relationship building and trust
The issue of trust between civilians and military forces was an issue that was uncovered
during multiple interviews, although it was not specifically addressed by one particular line of
questioning. This same topic emerged across many interviews, highlighted particularly by those
with significant field experience in CIV-MIL operations. There is wide recognition that CIV-MIL
humanitarian relationships have been trending positively in recent years, but there are still
deep seeded issues that can only be addressed with intentional action:
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“There is a strong concern among humanitarian actors that isn’t always borne out by
evidence, or let’s say hasn’t been documented by evidence, in terms of the compromises
that working with military actors produce by that relationship.”
“You can only build the trust over time; you can’t surge that in… we don’t keep staff on
the ground for extended periods of time.”
Trust was tied to relationship building by many of the interviewees, and joint training events
prior to a crisis were identified as a way to bridge the cultural gap between the two worlds.
Given the high turnover rate in military assignments and throughout the humanitarian
community, relationships must be intentionally cultivated and maintained. References were
made to misconceptions about capabilities for both sides, with militaries tending to
underestimate humanitarian capabilities and civilians overestimating militaries. Cultural
differences abound between the two groups and even across the USG interagency among those
who may not be used to working in close proximity to military forces. One former USG official
remarked about these cultural differences:
“I found it, in many ways, easier to deal with the Iraqis than the US Military.”
Although differences are evident between the different groups, multiple respondents noted
that face-to-face meetings and events that are designed to foster collaborative discussion and
comradery can result in a much smoother emergency response, as relationships have been
established and those involved have already developed a shared sense of purpose in their own
way.
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There was an optimistic outlook for the future of CIV-MIL humanitarian operations as
long as efforts are made to address identified shortfalls such as engagement with NSAGs and
lack of stakeholder diversity at CIV-MIL training events. Also frequently cited was that while
many organizations, particularly within the INGO community, may state their direct opposition
to cooperation with military actors, the reality is quite the opposite:
“We’ve made huge strides since early 2000’s, both on natural disaster response and how
we work with militaries, which I think has helped move us toward a more positive
engagement with military actors within complex emergencies… the reality is there is
nowhere in the world where we are not operating together (humanitarians and
militaries).”
This opinion was also prevalent when discussing CIV-MIL interactions with NSAGs, and how
there will continue to be a need for understanding the interests of each party prior to
conducting a joint public health operation principally within a non-international conflict setting.
The increased prevalence and variety of NSAGs across the humanitarian space will necessitate
engagement at a more frequent rate, and the participants agreed that the CIV-MIL community
must better prepare for this eventuality.

DISCUSSION
Through analysis of the interviews conducted with subject matter experts from
humanitarian organizations, USG agencies and academia, this study sought to better
understand the current challenges and gaps surrounding CIV-MIL public health operations
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occurring in unstable locations populated by NSAGs. The interview findings coupled with the
literature review demonstrate widespread agreement that NSAGs and health threats
represent a critical factor to address within these complex humanitarian emergencies, but
little documented guidance or training material to effectively accomplish the task. There was
also significant support for a scenario-based training framework that could be utilized in joint
CIV-MIL training events. A recent article published in Joint Force Quarterly discusses the
prominent role of US military involvement in disaster response and humanitarian operations
that is likely to continue with the increasing frequency of major global crises. 35 The authors
recommend development of tailored training for use within the Military Health System to
systematically address shortfalls within public health and medical training for these operations.
The definitional challenges surrounding NSAGs signify the importance of establishing
which of these groups may be willing to partner with a CIV-MIL humanitarian operation, and
which groups are unwilling to engage or may actively oppose humanitarian action in the areas
under their influence or control. There are organizations and researchers currently working
through the many legal issues of cooperating with NSAGs as it relates to IHL, but by no means
has a consensus been reached at the international level on best practices for engagement. 36 A
relevant, working definition for NSAGs in the context of public health humanitarian operations
should encompass two points at a minimum: 1) the group is not directly affiliated with an
internationally recognized state government; 2) the group has the potential to deny, delay, or
disrupt humanitarian assistance operations in the area of concern. If a universal definition is
created that is narrower in scope there is risk of excluding important actors in certain contexts
that should be addressed during the planning process and throughout the operation.
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Based on the positive responses from interviewees, a framework of this style with a
public health and medical focus would likely be well received among both the humanitarian
community and military forces. The framework could be utilized as a supplement to or a basis
for existing and future CIV-MIL training events. An ideal starting point may be the CivilianMilitary Humanitarian Response Workshop that is hosted annually by Brown University and the
USNWC.37 While the audience may not be explicitly populated by physicians or public health
experts, the workshop could act as an additional clearing house for the framework to receive
additional criticism and refinement. Given that the target audience for the framework includes
civilian INGOs, there would need to be acceptance from within UNOCHA as well as they
typically function as a conduit for information exchange among the CIV-MIL actors. Although
the framework was not presented in a finalized form that is ready to be included in guidance or
doctrine, there was broad agreement that the topic is of critical importance and that this
discussion could not come at a more critical time.

Study Limitations
Although an in-depth literature and doctrine review was conducted, a true systematic
review was not performed for this study. As such, we may have unintentionally missed certain
documents that could have helped inform the research. Fortunately, there are recent studies
and articles highlighting much of the relevant guidance documents utilized in the humanitarian
CIV-MIL community, so there is less concern that a major omission was made within that body
of evidence.
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While ten interviews provided for a variety of experiences and opinions to be examined,
this relatively small number leaves potential for biased responses. There were certain voices
that were absent from the research, particularly from within the INGO community and nonWestern organizations. There was also no conversation with members of non-US governments
or militaries, which again may introduce bias based on experiences specific to the USG over the
last few decades.

Future Directions
The guidance documents within the CIV-MIL community surrounding NSAGs and public
health emergencies should be revised with a focus on integration of the two concepts. Multiple
organizations, including UNOHCA and ICRC, are actively involved in efforts to develop
recommendations and best practices surrounding engagement with NSAGs. Other international
medical organizations are working on similar issues for use during complex public health
emergencies. However, the fact remains that existing guidance does not adequately address
CIV-MIL public health operations in the presence of NSAGs and updates are required in order to
ensure institutional knowledge and critical planning factors are captured and considered.
The scenario framework should be propagated among additional stakeholders within
the humanitarian network for additional examination and analysis. Multiple interviewees
suggested that medically-focused INGOs will be important voices in this discussion, with
Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) and the International Medical Corps
mentioned explicitly. This would likely be best accomplished through UNOCHA coordination, or
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through academic institutions acting as a neutral middle-ground for civilians and members of
military forces. Ideally, UNOCHA or the Brown-USNWC partnership could utilize a refined
version of this framework as an engagement tool during future CIV-MIL workshops. Military
sponsored training events are also an ideal place to field-test this framework, although
intentional efforts must be made to ensure members of civilian organizations are in
attendance. Training events and schools within the US Military Health System or other national
military medical forces are another potential avenue for propagation of this framework.
This study represents an important first step in addressing shortfalls within the CIV-MIL
humanitarian community regarding the substantial influence of NSAGs during current and
future complex humanitarian emergencies. The many unique aspects of engagement with
NSAGs must be acknowledged in public forums and joint training events. By utilizing a basic
training framework that is historically informed and flexible for use across multiple contexts, it
is possible to address ethical, legal and technical challenges inherent in these interactions in a
more systematic manner. Addressing these issues in a collaborative setting will allow joint CIVMIL public health operations to maximize the provision of humanitarian assistance while
limiting problematic friction points identified during previous response efforts.
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APPENDIX 2
Sample Recruitment E-mail Text
Hello,
My name is A.J. Chambers and I am a second-year student at Yale School of Public Health and a
Major in the US Army. I am excited to work with you and to learn more about your experiences
in the CIV-MIL arena which will help inform my Master's thesis research.
The purpose of this project is to conduct semi-structured interviews with subject matter
experts in the field of CIV-MIL relations and analyze themes and gaps that emerge regarding
dealings with Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG), with a focus on legal and ethical implications.
I am particularly interested in your personal experiences with NSAG, and the intersection of
militaries and humanitarian organizations with these actors. Given the fact that much of the
current UN and USG doctrine/guidance does not address medical or public health-related
complex emergencies, I also hope to focus on these situations rather than natural disaster
scenarios, but this will of course depend on your experience and the flow of our conversation. I
am particularly interested in the ethical implications of interactions with NSAG during a public
health emergency in conflict settings, where conditions may necessitate establishing
unorthodox relationships in order to conduct infectious disease surveillance, emergency
medical care, or other medical operations.
The overall goal of my project is to conduct interviews with a range of individuals representing
USG (DOD, HHS, DOS), Humanitarian organizations (INGO and UN agencies), and academics as
well as to review current literature and international guidance documents in order to identify
relevant gaps that exist. I will then synthesize the findings in order to inform a basic training
framework. Hopefully this will result in inclusion of legal, ethical and moral decision-making
strategies for civilian and military personnel interacting with NSAG during a protracted public
health emergency within a conflict setting (such as Ebola in West Africa, Cholera outbreaks in
Yemen, COVID-19 and IDP, etc.).
I am happy to answer any questions or concerns you may have about the project, and would be
happy to discuss via email or over the phone. Your identity will be kept anonymous in the final
manuscript, with only agency identification used (i.e. – no name, rank, position held).
If you are interested in participating, I will send you a consent form that has been approved by
Yale University with some additional information on what to expect. The interviews will be
conducted via Zoom - I will send a calendar invite with the proper link once we have agreed on
a date/time that works.
Thank you!
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APPENDIX 3

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPATION IN A RESEARCH STUDY
YALE UNIVERSITY
(IRB Protocol# 2000030202)
Study Title: The Intersection of Humanitarians, Militaries and Non-State Armed Groups during
Public Health Emergencies in Conflict Settings: A Recommended Framework for Future
Doctrine
Principal Investigator (the person who is responsible for this research):
A.J. Chambers, DVM; 203-901-2314; Andrew.chambers@yale.edu
Research Study Summary:
 We are asking you to join a research study.


The purpose of this research study is to conduct semi-structured interviews with subject
matter experts in the field of CIV-MIL relations and analyze themes and gaps that emerge
regarding dealings with Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG). I am particularly interested in
personal experiences with NSAG, and the intersection of militaries and humanitarian
organizations with these actors. Given the fact that much of the current doctrine/guidance
does not address medical or public health-related complex emergencies, I also hope to
focus on these situations rather than natural disaster scenarios, but this will be dependent on
the participants experiences. The overall goal is to discuss personal experiences of the
interviewee, gaps that exist and why, and synthesize the findings in order to develop a basic
framework for legal, ethical and moral decision-making for civilian and military personnel
interacting with NSAG during a protracted public health emergency within a conflict setting
(such as Ebola in West Africa, Cholera outbreaks in Yemen, COVID-19 and IDP, etc.).



Study activities will include: Virtual Interviews (via Zoom or other agreed upon platform)
will be conducted for approximately 45-60 minutes. The interviews will be recorded
and kept on a local computer for further review, and will not be uploaded to any cloudbased software or external websites.



Your involvement will require 45-75 minutes for the recorded interview.



We do not expect any risks from taking part in this study. All responses will be kept
anonymous and no personally identifiable information will be collected during the interview.



The study may have no benefits to you, other than interesting discussion and reflection on
past experiences. The benefit to the broader civilian and military community will, hopefully,
entail identification of overarching themes that are urgently needed to address gaps in
international CIV-MIL guidance documents.
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Taking part in this study is your choice. You can choose to take part, or you can choose not
to take part in this study. You also can change your mind at any time. Whatever choice you
make will not have any effect on your relationship with Yale School of Public Health.



Ask the study staff questions about anything you do not understand. Once you understand
the study, we will ask you if you wish to participate; if so, we will continue with the study
procedures described in this form.

Are there any costs to participation? Will I be paid for participation?
You will not have to pay for taking part in this study. You will not be paid for taking part in this
study.
How will you keep my data safe and private?
All of your responses will be anonymous. Only the researchers involved in this study and those
responsible for research oversight (such as representatives of the Yale University Human
Research Protection Program, the Yale University Institutional Review Boards, and others) will
have access to any information that could identify you that you provide. We will share it with
others if you agree to it or when we have to do it because U.S. or State law requires it.
Each interview participant will be assigned a random ID number to be used during qualitative
analysis of the interview content. All files will be password protected on a local computer system
(and not uploaded to any external websites or platforms).
When we publish the results of the research or talk about it in conferences, we will not use your
name.
We may share information about you with other researchers for future studies, but we will not
use your name or any other identifiers. We will not ask you for any additional permissions.
What if I want to refuse or end participation before the study is over?
Taking part in this study is your choice. You can choose to take part, or you can choose not to
take part in this study. You also can change your mind at any time. Whatever choice you make
will not have any negative consequences.
Who should I contact if I have questions?
Please feel free to ask about anything you don't understand.
If you have questions later or if you have a research-related problem, you can call the Principal
Investigator at 203.901.2314
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have complaints about
this research, you call the Yale Institutional Review Boards at (203) 785-4688 or email
hrpp@yale.edu.
Would you like to participate?
Please feel free to respond directly via email, or provide verbal consent via the phone number
listed above
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